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I
TiH HisroucAL PER pEcTIvE
When the Founding Fathers gathered in Philadelphia in 1787 to draft the United
States Constitution, the concept of separation of powers was a fundamental political
maxim which dominated the thinking of many of the members of the Constitutional
Convention. A substantial number of the draftsmen arrived predisposed toward
creating a government separated into three co-equal branches-the executive, the
legislative, and the judicial.
The separation of powers doctrine grew out of centuries of political and philo-
sophical development. Its origins can be traced to the fourth century B.C. when
Aristotle, in his treatise entitled Politics, described three agencies of government:
the general assembly, the public officials, and the judiciary.' In republican Rome,
there was a somewhat similar system consisting of public assemblies, the senate, and
the public officials, all operating on a principle of checks and balances.2 Following
the fall of the Roman Empire, Europe became fragmented into nation-states, and
from the end of the Middle Ages until the eighteenth century the dominant gov-
ernmental structure consisted of a concentrated power residing in hereditary rulers,
the sole exception being the developmentof the English Parliament in the seventeenth
century With the birth of Parliament, the theory of three branches of government
reappeared, this time embodied in John Locke's Two Treatises of Government (1689),
where these three powers were defined as "legislative," "executive," and "federative."4
Locke, however, did not consider the three branches to be co-equal, nor were they
designed to operate independently.5 Locke considered the legislative branch to be
supreme, while the executive and federative functions-internal and external affairs,
respectively-were left within the control of the monarch, a scheme which obviously
corresponded with the dual form of government prevailing in England at the time,
the Parliament and the King.'
The doctrine was refined and expanded by Baron de Montesquieu, whose Spirit
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of the Laws appeared in 1748 and was well known to many members of the Consti-
tutional Convention. The Frenchman based his theory on his understanding of the
English system, which, since the time of Locke, had generated a more independent
judiciary and a tendency toward a greater distinction among the three branches. In
discussing the importance of clear delineations of power among the three branches,
Montesquieu wrote:
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body,
there can be no liberty, because apprehension might arise lest the same monarch
or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separate from the legis-
lative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the
subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then
the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with
violence and oppression.
There would be an end of everything, were the same man or the same body,
whether of the nobles or the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting
the laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the cases of indi-
viduals. 7
Montesquieu also observed that, in the British system, the judiciary ranked "next
to nothing" when compared with the other branches of government! Some seventeen
years later, Blackstone noted the importance of a more powerful and independent
judiciary in his Commentaries, which were a primary reference for the American
colonists:
Were it [the judicial power] joined with the legislative, the life, liberty and prop-
erty, of the subject would be in the hands of arbitrary judges, whose decisions
would be then regulated only by their own opinions, and not by any fundamental
principles of law; which, though legislators may depart from, yet judges are bound
to observe. Were it joined with the executive, this union might soon be an over-
balance for the legislative. 9
just two years before the Constitutional Convention, William Paley, the English
philosopher and theologian, observed in his Moral and Political Philosophy:
[T]he judges of the land become not infrequently the arbitrators between the
king and the people, on which account they ought to be independent of either;
or, what is the same thing, equally dependent upon both; that is, if they be ap-
pointed by one, they should be removable only by the other.'0
7I B. nE MoNr.sQuIEu, SPnuT OF THE LAws 152 (Nugent ed. 1823).
8 Id. at 156.
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Thus the doctrine of separation of powers, including an independent judiciary, was
reasonably well developed by 1787 when the framers of the Constitution met, and
its incorporation into the document they hoped to draft was of paramount consider-
ation to them. It was a doctrine of such broad importance that it had been treated by
scores of writers, and discussed by knowledgeable men throughout the colonies. It
is doubtful that many members of the Constitutional Convention arrived in Phila-
delphia completely unaware of its impact. Beyond the theoretical importance of the
doctrine, the founding fathers had learned a difficult lesson during their first attempt
at government under the Articles of Confederation, which had made "virtually
no concession" to the principle.' That attempt at national government, as any stu-
dent of American history knows, was not an unqualified success. To correct the
shortcomings of the Articles, while at the same time providing checks against tyranny,
the founding fathers turned to the doctrine of separation of powers, including an
independent judiciary.
A. English Precedents
Many of the men who attended the Constitutional Convention were lawyers, and
virtually all of them were familiar with the centuries-old struggle for judicial in-
dependence in England. From what they accomplished, it is clear that one of their
overriding purposes in applying the doctrine of separation of powers to the new
Constitution was to carry that struggle to fruition.
Before the Norman conquest in England, judicial office was "communal" in
character, and the courts could not be considered the exclusive tools of the King.
Afterwards, the old communal courts were linked with the central curia, which
performed multiple functions, and which was staffed by the King's men-his
deputies by virtue of his commission. The causes brought before the curia were
decided under the King's writ, making the King himself the "fountain of justice."1
Heretofore, the grant of office in medieval England was practically the same as a grant
of land: it conferred an estate, so to speak, in the office, according to the terms of
the grant. Many of the King's offices became hereditary by this process, and thus less
useful to him. Accordingly, the functions of these hereditary offices were taken over
by newer positions, such as justidar and chancellor, which were filled by men of
lower birth but who, because they were dependent on the King, could be entrusted
with more power. The tenure of these new offices-which comprised much of the
central curia-was at the pleasure of the King.'" Of course, officials appointed at
the King's pleasure could be removed by him for any reason whatsoever. Those
appointed during good behavior, which in effect conferred a life estate in the office,
"z Wright, The Origins of the Separation of Powers in America, 13 ECONOMIA i69, 179 (933).
" Mcilwain, The Tenure of English Judges, 7 Am. PoL. Sci. REV. 217, 218 (1913). While not
documented, this paper, prepared for oral presentation before a meeting of the Amercian Political Science
Association, is highly readable and accurate in detail.
Id. at 219.
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could be forced to forfeit their office for misconduct, real or manufactured; the
character of the conduct, and whether or not the office would be forfeited, could be
determined by the King's Bench under a writ of scire facias.'4
The first major challenge to the practice of appointing judges at the King's
pleasure came in 1628, when Charles I ordered Sir John Walter to surrender his
patent as chief baron of the exchequer because he was dissatisfied with one of
Walter's decisions. Walter refused, arguing that his tenure was based on good
behavior, not on the King's pleasure, and that he should be removed only if a scire
facias proceeding determined he had misbehaved. Embarrassed, Charles allowed
Walter to keep his patent, his office, and his revenues, although the judge never
again appeared in the court of the exchequer. Although Charles had given in some-
what to Walter, within the next decade he dismissed several other judges and set
the stage for the Long Parliament of i64o-4i to demand that he appoint a committee
to study the tenure of judges. The result was a petition to the King requesting that
he substitute tenure during good behavior for tenure during pleasure. Charles com-
plied.r'
Despite the concessions, English kings continued to dismiss judges sporadically
during the next sixty years. This was especially true during the reigns of Charles II
and James II, when the "transferrals and removals were many" and "passed all
precedent and all decency."' 6 Finally, in 1701, Parliament passed the Act of Settle-
ment, the principal statute dealing with judicial tenure in modern England and "the
one substantially followed ever since."' 7 Among other things, it provided that:
Judges' commissions be made quamdiu se bene gesserit and their salaries ascertained
and established but upon the Address of both Houses of Parliament it may be
lawful to remove them.18
Tenure during good behavior-an essential requisite for judicial independence-
had become part of the British law, although it was timed not to take effect until
after the death of the King and Princess Anne "and in default of issue of either."
Thus, it was not until 176o that the tenure of the sitting judges ceased to depend
upon the pleasure of the reigning monarch."9 Even then, "their tenure was far more
secure than it had been under the Stuarts, but they enjoyed at best a limited
independence."20 Judges continued to be active politically well into the late eighteenth
x Ross, 'Good Behavior' of Federal Judges, 12 U. KAN. Crrx L. REv. 119, i2o (1944).
' VI E. Foss, THE JUDGES OF ENGLAND 372 (1857). In his brief biography, Foss recounts that after
assuming the duties of chief baron, Walter "did not answer to the king's expectations. He was too in-
dependent and too honest to suit the royal will." Id. at 371-72.
11 T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF iHE COMMON LAw 6o-6i (5th ed. x956). See also Mcllwain,
supra note r2, at 223.
7 Mclwain, supra note 12, at 224.
is 12 & 13 William III, c. 2, § 3 (1700). See also TE E-GHTEENTH CENTURY CONsmtroN, 1688-
1815, at 59 (E. Williams ed. 196o).
r George III, c. 23 (176o).
o Ziskind, Judicial Tenure in the American Constitution: English and American Precedents, 1969
Sup. CT. REV. 135, 137.
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century,2 1 and they still could be removed upon address by both houses for any
reason whatsoever.2
Nonetheless, the Act of Settlement established the basis for the modern English
judicial system, and it has been observed that:
The net result of it all is that... an English Judge holding by patent quamdiu se
bene gesserit, like any other official so holding, may lose his office by judicial
process under a writ of scire facias, if it appear that the conditions of the patent
have not been fulfilled. Second, he may be impeached and removed from office by
sentence of the house of lords, though this has not occurred for over a century.
Third, the crown may remove him without any cause shown, after a joint address of
the houses of parliament requesting it, but not otherwise 23
B. Colonial Developments
While the struggle for judicial independence was proceeding at a slow but steady
pace in England, there was no comparable progress in the American colonies.
For the most part, early colonial judges served at the pleasure of the royal governors,
and except for Pennsylvania, no colonial assembly had the power to impeach a
judge.24 However, the tendency during the later colonial period was to place some
restrictions on the removal power of the governors, and longer tenure based on good
behavior was established in several colonies. 2 Then, in 1761, acting on advice of the
Board of Trade, the King made tenure at royal pleasure, ostensibly "on ground
that the state of learning in the colonies was so low that it was with difficulty
that men could be found competent to administer the judicial offices." 20 Later, in
1772, George III established a fixed salary for the judges of the superior court of
Massachusetts, thus preventing them from receiving their usual grants from the
House of Representatives and the council and governor. This action aroused so much
opposition that it has been credited with causing the complaint in the Declaration of
Independence that George III "has made judges dependent upon his will alone for
the payment of their salaries."'
Thus, due to the King's growing distrust of the colonies, judicial independence
in America had taken a turn for the worse at the time of the Revolution, although
it had been a goal of the colonists for some time, and despite their limited successes
in promoting it:
One of the long-continued struggles of the assemblies was for judicial tenure during
good behavior, a tenure -much more conducive to judicial independence than that
"- PLuCxNETr, supra note 16, at 248. Plucknett recites the activities of 'William Murray, Earl of Mans-
field, who as Lord Chief Justice of the King's Bench remained in the House of Lords and, among other
things, argued against repeal of the Stamp Act.
22 W. CARaPEN , JuticrAL TENURE iN mai UNiTED STATES 125 (1918).
25 Mclhwain, supra note 12, at 225.
' Ziskind, supra note 2o, at 138.
2 2Wright, supra note i , at 176.
CARU'ENTER, supra note 22, at 2-3.2 7 1id. at 2.
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during the pleasure of the executive. Despite the opposition of the Crown, extending
even to the removal of one governor who failed to veto such an act, the assemblies
managed to establish the longer tenure in several colonies. 28
After 1776, the states developed constitutions containing various prohibitions of
executive control over the judiciary, and these documents provided some powerful
precedents for the founding fathers when they met eleven years later. Some states,
such as Connecticut, retained basically the same form of government as had existed
prior to independence. There was no uniform standard to be followed by those
states which drafted new constitutions, and naturally the new governing documents
revealed no accepted method of selecting judges or granting them tenure2 9 For
example, New York granted tenure to its supreme court judges during good behavior,
while New Jersey gave them seven-year terms.3 ° In most states, as in the abortive
Articles of Confederation, the legislature was the dominant power in government
under the early state constitutions, playing a leading role in the choice and removal
of judges in all but a few states where it was limited to impeachment of judges
for misconduct0- James Madison observed at the Philadelphia convention that:
[E]xperience in all states has evinced a powerful tendency in the legislature to
absorb all power into its vortex. This was the real source of danger to the American
[state] Constitutions; and suggested the necessity of giving every defensive authority
to the other departments that was consistent with republican principles.8 2
The Bill of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution of i78o took a position sub-
stantially like Madison's when it stated unequivocally that:
It is essential to the preservation of the rights of every individual, his life, liberty,
property, and character, that there be an impartial interpretation of the laws, and
administration of justice. It is the right of every citizen to be tried by judges as
free, impartial and independent as the lot of humanity will admit. It is therefore
not only the best policy, but for the security of the rights of the people, and of every
citizen, that judges hold their office as long as they behave themselves well; and
that they should have honourable salaries ascertained and established by standing
laws. 3
That same Massachusetts Constitution also provided a more specific clause de-
lineating its separation of powers doctrine:
In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never
exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall
s Wright, supra note ii, at 177.
,' Ziskind, supra note 20o, at 139. This source gives a rather detailed survey of the judicial systems
initially used by each of the new states.
-1 Id. at 140.
"Id. at 138-39.
" Quoted in F. GREEN, CONsnITtrrONAL DEvELOPmENT IN THE SouTm ATLANTIc STATES, 1776-i860,
at X03 (1930).
83 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS op THE
UNrrED Sras, art. 29, at 960 (B. Poore ed. I878).
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never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial
shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them; to the
end that it may be a government of laws, and not of men.34
Despite Massachusetts' provision for separation of powers and a more independent
judiciary, Madison said later in The Federalist, No. 47, that:
If we look into the constitutions of the several States we find that, notwithstanding
the emphatical and, in some instances, the unqualified terms in which this axiom
has been laid down, there is not a single instance in which the several departments
of power have been kept absolutely separate and distinct.
Thus it is clear that the founders arrived at Philadelphia familiar with English
and American precedents of separated powers and judicial independence. From
English history and from their knowledge of the political philosophers, they had
gained familiarity with and respect for the principle of judicial independence. From
their own colonial experience and from their state constitutions, they had learned
the importance of incorporating the doctrine in the governing documents in order
to assure the fair administration of justice.
C. The Constitutional Convention
John Randolph of Virginia offered the initial proposal relating to the judicial
branch at the Constitutional Convention; Randolph came from a state where the
legislature had been dominant. His proposal provided for judges to be chosen by
the national legislature, and to "hold their offices during good behavior."" Charles
Pinckney of South Carolina submitted an alternative proposal on the same day
which also provided for judicial tenure during good behavior 8 Hamilton, whose
primary concern was the establishment of a strong executive, later suggested the
inclusion of a judiciary article providing for a supreme court with justices serving
during good behavior and removable only by conviction on impeachment for some
crime or misdemeanor 7
When the judiciary article reached the floor of the Convention for debate, an
attempt was made by John Dickinson of Delaware to install address as a means of
removing judges. After the words "good behavior" would have been inserted the
words "provided that they may be removed by the Executive on the application [by]
the Senate and House of Representatives." Gouverneur Morris thought the provision
would be a "contradiction in terms," since it would subject judges who would be
serving during good behavior to removal without a trial. Another objection was
made by Randolph, who "opposed the motion as weakening too much the in-
dependence of the Judges." The proposal was defeated seven to one, with three
li d., art. 30, at 960.
"I M. FAUitND, Tim REcoDs oF 7a FEnsAL. CoNvarNoN oF 1787, at 2x (1934).
"I HI id. at 6oo.
*lid. at 628.
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states absent, and removal by address was specifically rejected by the founding
fathersas The tenure of federal judges was thus established as during good be-
havior subject only to impeachment by the House of Representatives and conviction
by the Senate sitting as a jury, and was embodied in section I of article III as
finally adopted by the framers:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.
The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during
good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their services, a Compensation,
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
The framers did not include a specific clause in the Constitution separating
the powers of government among the three branches. However, they did classify
the powers and assign them to their respective departments. In addition to article
III, which assigned the judiciary power, article I, section I provided that "All legis-
lative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States ... "
and article II, section I specified that "The executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America."
An early criticism of the Constitution was that it did not specifically separate the
powers in accord with Montesquieu's maxim but rather that it actually meshed some
of the powersO9 The overlapping-popularly described as the system of checks and
balances-takes several forms: for instance, the power of appointment is given to
the executive, but with the advice and consent of the Senate, and impeachment,
which in essence is a judicial function, was given to the Congress. 4° However con-
fusing such a system may seem, it has served a valuable purpose, and was ably
defended by Madison in The Federalist, No. 47:
The magistrate in whom the whole executive power resides cannot of himself
make a law, though he can put a negative on every law; nor administer justice
in person, though he has the appointment of those who do administer it. The
judges can exercise no executive prerogative, though they are shoots from the exec-
utive stock; nor any legislative function, though they may be advised by the legisla-
tive councils. The entire legislature can perform no judiciary act, though by the joint
act of two of its branches the judges may be removed from their offices, and though
one of its branches is possessed of the judicial power of the last resort. The entire
legislature, again, can exercise no executive prerogative, though one of its branches
constitutes the supreme executive magistry, and another, on the impeachment of
the third, can try and condemn all the subordinate officers in the executive depart-
ment.
II id. at 428-29.
Fairlie, supra note 3, at 398. Madison, in The Federalist, No. 47, states that "One of the principal
objections inculcated by the more respectable adversaries to the Constitution is its supposed violation of
the political maxim that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments ought to be separate and dis-
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'
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The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive and judiciary, in the
same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed,
or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.
Another complaint lodged against the new Constitution while it was before the
states for ratification was the absence of a specific method of removing judges. The
opponents of ratification recognized that the Constitution made provision by its
impeachment process for the removal of judges from their judicial offices for
"Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors" (article II, section 4).
They complained of the Constitution, however, because it made no provision for
removal of judges for mental infirmities arising out of age or other causes. The
founding fathers omitted a provision for removal on such grounds because, as
Hamilton stated in The Federalist, No. 79, it "would much oftener give scope to
personal and party attachments and enmities than advance the interests of justice or
the public good." Said Hamilton:
The want of a provision for removing the judges on account of inability has been
a subject of complaint. But all considerate men will be sensible that such a provision
would either not be practiced upon or would be more liable to abuse than cal-
culated to answer any good purpose. The mensuration of the faculties of the mind,
has, I believe, no place in the catalogue of known arts. An attempt to fix the
boundary between the regions of ability and inability would much oftener give
scope to personal and party attachments and eunities than advance the interests of
justice or the public good. The result, except in the case of insanity, must for the
most part be arbitrary; and insanity, without any formal or express provision, may
be safely pronounced to be a virtual disqualification.
Hamilton went on in The Federalist, No. 79, to declare that investigations into the
abilities of a judge "must forever be vague and dangerous." The early New York state
constitution, he said, avoided such investigations by providing that all judges retire
at sixty years of age. Hamilton added:
I believe there are few at present who do not disapprove of this provision. There
is no station in relation to which it is less proper than to that of a judge. The de-
liberating and comparing faculties generally preserve their strength much beyond
that period in men who survive it; and when, in addition to this circumstance, we
consider how few there are who outlive the season of intellectual vigor and how
improbable it is that any considerable portion of the bench, whether more or less
numerous, should be in such a situation at the same time, we shall be ready to
conclude that limitations of this sort have little to recommend them in a republic
where fortunes are not affluent and pensions not expedient, the dismission of men
from stations in which they have served their country long and usefully, on which
they depend for subsistence, and from which it will be too late to resort to any
other occupation for livelihood, ought to have some better apology to humanity
than is to be found in the imaginary danger of a superannuated bench.
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Earlier, in The Federalist, No. 78, Hamilton defended the appointment of judges
for tenure during good behavior, which he considered "the citadel of the public
justice and the public security." He continued:
According to the plan of the convention, all judges who may be appointed by
the United States are to hold their offices during good behavior; which is most
conformable to the most approved of State constitutions. . . . The standards of
good behavior for the continuance in office of the judicial magistracy is certainly
one of the most valuable of the modern improvements in the practice of govern-
ment. In a monarchy it is an excellent barrier to the despotism of the prince;
in a republic it is no less excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of
the representative body. And it is the best expedient which can be devised in any
government to secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws.
In The Federalist, No. 51, Madison commented on the importance of the judiciary's
independence from the appointing authority:
In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the
different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands
to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department
should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the
members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the
members of the others . . . . In the constitution of the judiciary department in
particular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle: first, be-
cause peculiar qualifications being essential in the members, the primary considera-
tion ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications;
secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in
that department must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority con-
ferring them. It is equally evident that members of each department should be as
little dependent as possible on those of the others for the emoluments annexed to
their offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of
the legislature in the particular, their independence in every other would be
merely nominal.
The well-known rule of construction that the expression of one thing is the
exclusion of another compels the conclusion that the founding fathers intended
that no federal judge should be removed from office except through the impeach-
ment process. Hamilton justified the purpose of the framers on this score when he
said in The Federalist, No. 79:
The precautions for [judges'] responsibility are comprised in the article respecting
impeachments. .. . This is the only provision on the point which is consistent
with the necessary independence of the judicial character, and is the only one which
we find in our own Constitution in respect to our own judges.
D. The Congress of 1789
The first Congress meeting under the new Constitution promptly passed the
Judiciary Act of 1789, which established the Supreme Court and a federal district
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court in each state.41 It also passed a law making it a crime for a judicial officer to
accept a bribe, and, on conviction, disqualifying him from holding any office of
honor, trust, or profit with the United States government. The first of these
acts set the tone of the federal judiciary and created a general structure which has
been retained, with expansion and revision, to the present. Although the latter has
been interpreted in some quarters as an early attempt to place some limit on the
activities of federal judges outside the impeachment process, the statute has never
been enforced.
During debate on the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congressman Smith of South Caro-
lina counseled his colleagues that it would not be easy to alter the federal system
once it was established:
The judges are to hold their commissions during good behavior, and after they
are appointed they are removable only by impeachment; in consequence the system
must be a permanent one.4 4
E. The Jeffersonian Democrats
The federal judiciary established by the Act of 1789 remained essentially intact
until the Federalists lost the election of i8oo. Before they lost control of the admin-
istration and Congress early the next year, the Federalists established a number
of new judgeships by passing the Judiciary Act of i8oi, 4 and President John Adams
appointed members of his party to the positions during the last hours of his admin-
istration. 48 When the Jeffersonian Democrats took office shortly thereafter, they
proceeded to repeal the Act of i8oi, thereby setting off a monumental debate on the
powers of Congress to "undo what it had done" to the federal judiciary.47
Three years later, the Democrats took another swipe at the courts, this time
with an attempt to impeach and convict the Federalist Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court, Samuel Chase. He was charged with misconduct while holding a
trial for sedition. The accusations obviously were politically motivated. Although
Chase was impeached by the House and the effort received a majority vote in the
Senate, it failed for lack of the necessary two-thirds vote. However, the Jeffersonian
Democrats managed in that same year to bring about the first successful impeach-
ment, conviction, and removal of a federal judge--John Pickering of New Hamp-
"Judiciary Act of 1789, I Stat. 73.
"2 Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 19, § 21, I Stat. 117.
"Testimony of Peter G. Fish at Hearings on The Independence of Federal Judges Before the Sub-
comm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judidary, 9st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). (Un-
published). These hearings are discussed infra.
4 1 ANNALs OF CONG. 86o (1789).
"Act of Feb. 13, i8oi, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89.
o CAU'ErNTEnR, supra note 22, at 55.
"
T Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of Federal Judges: Some Notes from History, 36 U.
Cm. L. Rav. 665, 671 (z969). Professor Kurland's article is an excellent review of the debate and of
other attempts to install legislative limits on the tenure and independence of federal judges.
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shire, who was charged with violations of statute, conducting court while intoxicated,
and blasphemy on the bench."
F. The Court Packing Debate
Attempts to remove judges by means other than impeachment gained renewed
impetus in the I93OS when President Franklin D. Roosevelt attempted to "pack"
the Supreme Court, and legislation was sponsored by Representative Hatton Sum-
ners of Texas, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, which would have
created a panel to rule on the fitness of federal judges4 The efforts sparked a great
debate over the constitutionality of alternative methods of removal. The basic argu-
ment on behalf of constitutionality was propounded by Professor Burke Shartel,
whose treatise 0 was written a few years before the debate and is still relied upon
extensively by those who believe there can be some method of removal other than
impeachment under the Constitution. Taking the opposing view was a federal
district judge and legal scholar, the late Merrill E. Otis 1 The debate centered
around the legislative proposal to create a tribunal to rule on the fitness of federal
judges alluded to above.
Shartel took the position that impeachment was designed to restrict the power
of the Congress over judges, not that of the judicial branch over its own members5
He argued that the removal of a judge involves a justiciable dispute and as such can
be handled by the judicial branch. Admitting that the separation of powers doctrine
precludes executive removal, Shartel asserted that legislative removal is possible
only through impeachment, bills of attainder having been rejected at the Constitu-
tional Convention. He said:
The separation of powers doctrine stands in the way of any legislative removal of
executive and judicial officers, except as such removal is expressly authorized in one
form-impeachmentPsa
'8For a concise resume of impeachments, see The Kelly Memorandum, 116 CONG. REc. H8o39 (daily
ed. Aug. io, 1970). Including Chase and Pickering, there have been a total of nine impeachments, based
on various charges. In 1830, James H. Peck of Missouri was impeached, but not convicted, for punishing
for contempt a lawyer who was critical of one of his opinions; in 1862, West H. Humphries was impeached
and convicted for aiding in the secession of Tennessee and serving as a Confederate judge; in 1904,
Charles Swayne of Florida was acquitted on charges involving false expense account claims, misuse of a
receivership for personal gain and living outside his district; in 1912, Robert W. Archbald was con-
victed and removed from the Commerce Court on charges of using his position to secure business favors;
in 1926, George W. English of Illinois resigned in the face of accusations that he had abused his power
by suspending and disbarring two attorneys, and that he had used his office for personal gain; in 1936,
Harold Louderback of California was acquitted of charges that he used his office to enrich his friends;
and, also in 1936, Halsted L. Ritter was convicted and removed on a charge that he had received kick-
backs from legal fees awarded his former law partner.
'" S. 4527 and H.R. Res. 2271, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1936). Both bills are reprinted in full in Otis,
A Proposed Tribunal: Is It Constitutional?, 7 U. KAux. Cirr L. Ray. 3, 10-12 (1938).
" Shartel, Federal Judges--Appointment, Supervision, and Removal-Some Possibilities Under the
Consttution, 28 Mscsm L. Rav. 870 (1930).
5 1Otis, supra note 49.
.
2Shartel, supra note 5o, at 894.
"'Id. at 881.
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Shartel believed that methods of judicial removal-scire jacias and quo warranto-
were still operative, enabling the judicial branch (presumably the Supreme Court or
some other body of judges) to remove members of the inferior courts.
Judge Otis answered Shartel with a question of his own:
The Constitution does separate our government into three independent branches.
But does not the independence of the judicial branch attach as much to the judges
of the inferior courts as it does to the justices of the highest court?54
He convincingly pointed out the absence in the Convention debates of any other
method of removal; the fact that the Constitution makes no distinctions between
judges, whether they be supreme or inferior-they are all to hold office "during
good behavior"; and that the Constitution fixes the term of a judge as life, leaving
the Congress no more power to alter that term than it has to alter the term of
the President or Vice President.
Otis also carefully analyzed the word "sole" used in describing the powers of im-
peachment:
It is well known, and often has it been said by the highest courts, that every
word of the Constitution was intended to have significance. If that is true of any
word, it is especially true of the strong word-"sole."
The Framers certainly would not have been so meticulous in the use of words,
so careful to use this particular strong word in the vesting of the impeachment
power, unless they had in mind either, (a), that in the past in English law the
power to charge misconduct against an officer for the purpose of securing his
removal from office had been exercised by some body or official other than the
House of Commons, or, (b), that in after years some one might conceive that the
power might be exercised by some other body or official than the House of Repre-
sentatives. The word "sole" was used to make it clear to all forever that, in the
American system, no significance should be given to any English precedent, if
there were any, whereby the power to charge misconduct for the purpose of ob-
taining removal of a civil officer from office, was held to be lodged in any other
than that legislative body directly representing the whole people.55
Shartel based his argument on the continued existence of a proceeding like scire
facias, and if Judge Otis did not demolish it, another scholar did when she said:
The clearest rejection of Shartel's argument lies in the fact that no colonial or state
constitution provided for such a use of scire facias, nor was a proposal made to
include it during the Constitutional Convention. Even in the unreformed common
law, there was a distinction between precedents and fossils. 6
The arguments put forward during the 1930s, of course, came and went with
the unsuccessful attempts to pack the court and to establish the judicial oversight
54 Otis, supra note 49, at 17.
r5Id. at 25-26.
o Ziskind, supra note 2o, at 138.
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tribunal. And so, for the most part, did attempts to erode the independence of our
federal judges, at least for thirty years.
II
COMMENTARY
I have attempted from the foregoing sketchy treatment of the historical basis
of judicial independence to show that the concept was a sine qua non to the men
who drafted the United States Constitution. Because of the limitations of space and
time, it was not possible for me to delve into the detail that would be appropriate
and that would even more strongly support my thesis that judicial independence
is the strongest safeguard against the exercise of tyrannical power by men who want
to live above the law, rather than under it. The separation of powers concept as
understood by the founding fathers assumed the existence of a judicial system
free from outside influence of whatever kind and from whatever source, and further
assumed that each individual judge would be free from coercion even from his own
brethren.
The founding fathers, in establishing our national government, reflected clearly
the lessons they had absorbed concerning the history of man's struggle to be free from
tyranny. They knew that those entrusted with governmental powers are susceptible
to the disease of tyrants-to what George Washington described in his Farewell
Address as the "love of power and proneness to abuse it."' 7 They realized that the
powers of public officers should be defined by laws which they, as well as the
people, are obliged to obey, and that liberty demands control by constant and
uniformly enforced laws rather than by the arbitrary and inconstant whims of willful
men.
They recognized the inalterable truth expressed by Thomas Hobbes, when he
said that freedom is "political power divided into small fragments,""8 and for that
reason they diffused national power among three branches of government, each
charged with specific responsibilities and each likewise precluded from exercising
those powers bestowed upon the other two branches. Because they had suffered the
burdens of tyranny, the founding fathers very carefully provided for a federal judiciary
that would operate completely independent of everything except the Constitution.
To my mind, an independent judiciary is perhaps the most essential characteristic
of a free society. From long experience as a practicing attorney, a trial judge, an
appellate judge, and now a legislator, I have had ample opportunity to observe and
appreciate the safeguards embodied in the separation of powers doctrine so wisely
formulated by our forefathers.
Unfortunately, the events of recent years have created an aura of crisis in many
sectors of our society, and in their haste to set right situations deemed disastrous,
17 MESSAGES AND PAPRS OF Tm PRSsmIENTS 211 (J. Richardson ed. x897).
"s H. MAINE, PoPUtLaR GOVE INMENT 70 (1885).
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leaders in all three branches of the government have proposed solutions ultimately
inimical to the constitutional safeguards so carefully formulated by the founding
fathers. The principle of judicial independence has been gravely endangered as a
result of this "crisis" approach to solving our problems. Beyond doubt during this
era of social upheaval, there is a rather extraordinary lack of confidence in many
of our governmental institutions, including the judiciary. Hence, it is not surprising
that some deeply concerned persons would emulate the example of Sampson, who, in
his blind zeal, destroyed the pillars on which the temple rested. There are now
pending before the Congress well over two dozen measures designed to place new
restrictions on federal judges. In many instances these measures represent a direct
assault upon the principle of judicial independence. Some of them are directed
toward limiting the non-judicial activities of federal judges, while others are designed
to provide means of disciplining the federal judiciary.
Because of the controversy over the proper role of the judiciary, the Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, " of which I am chairman,
conducted two series of hearings into the principle of judicial independence. The
first series of hearings undertook to investigate the many pertinent questions about
the non-judicial activities of judges which were raised in the wake of the Fortas
resignation. Thus, on July 14, 15, and i6, and September 30, 1969, the Sub-
committee heard testimony from an impressive list of expert witnesses ranging from
former Supreme Court Justices Tom C. Clark, Arthur J. Goldberg, and Stanley Reed,
to former Secretary of State Dean Acheson. The hearings emphasized the general
ramifications of proposed limitations on the extra-judicial activities of federal judges
rather than focusing on any single piece of proposed legislation. The hearings failed
to produce any consensus on precisely what constitutes an improper outside activity
for federal judges, although there was general agreement that the Congress should
be very reluctant to pass all-encompassing legislation which might result in undue
restrictions.' °
Because of the continuing clamor both in the press and in the Congress, the
Subcommittee this spring devoted four days of hearings to the independence of
"IThe Subcommittee on Separation of Powers originated under S. Res. 305, sponsored by Senators
Dirksen and Mansfield in the 8gth Congress, 2d Session. It is authorized to "make a full and complete
study of the separation of powers between the executive, judicial and legislative branches of Govcrn-
ment provided by the Constitution, the manner in which such power has been exercised by each branch
and the extent if any to which any branch or branches of the Government may have encroached upon
the powers, functions, and duties vested in any other branch by the Constitution of the United States."
Present membership consists of Sam f. Ervin, Jr., North Carolina, Chairman; John L. McClellan, Arkansas;
Quentin N. Burdick, North Dakota; Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., Maryland; and Robert P. Griffin, Michigan.
"0 Hearings on Nonjudicial Activities of Supreme Court Justices and Other Federal Judges Before the
Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, gist Cong., ist Sess. (1969).
(Unpublished.) These hearings are soon to be published by the Subcommittee, and should prove of great
value to scholars who wish to study contemporary viewpoints on judicial independence.
The Subcommittee, at this writing, is in the process of drafting a proposed set of suggestions regarding
what constitutes acceptable outside activities of federal judges. I should like to emphasize that these
would only be suggestions for possible use by the federal judiciary; they will not under any circumstances
be considered legislative proposals.
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federal judges. These hearings, conducted on April 7 and 9, and May 7 and 8, 1970,
were concerned with the roles of the Judicial Conference of the United States and
the judicial councils of the various circuits as they relate to the independence of
federal judges, and with certain legislative proposals introduced to expand the powers
of judges to oversee the judicial activities of their brethren."
During this second set of hearings, the Subcommittee paid particular attention
to Senate Bill 15o6, introduced in the First Session of the Ninety-first Congress by
Senator Joseph Tydings "to provide for improvement in the administration of courts
of the United States .... ." It is cited as the Judical Reform Act.6"
Title I of the Tydings bill would create a Commission on Judicial Disabilities and
Tenure, consisting of judges appointed by the Chief Justice, and empowered to
investigate charges of misconduct and to recommend to the Judicial Conference
the removal of a federal judge. In turn, the Conference would have the power
to remove the judge, subject to appeal to the Supreme Court by certiorari. Complaints
could be brought by "any person" against any federal judge, and the grounds for
removal could range from disability to conflict of interest. In effect, title I would
provide a means for removing federal judges from office without compliance with
the constitutional mandate that nothing except impeachment and conviction can be
used for that purpose. Obviously, possible objections to title I are manifold. Not only
does it raise serious constitutional questions, but its language presents intense prob-
lems of interpretations.
My colleague, Senator Tydings, of course, is concerned with improving the
machinery for the administration of justice. I share that concern, as all of us must
in this period when there are unprecedented backlogs in our courts, when justice
in one district may be swifter than in another, and when public respect for our
01 Hearings, supra note 43. These hearings also are being prepared by the Subcommittee for publica-
tion and will be available soon.
02 xi5 CoNo. Ruc. S2732-45. S. 15o6 and accompanying bills, S. 1507 through S. 1516, 9ist Cong.,
isr Sess. (969), are printed at this point in the Congressional Record. The pertinent provisions of S.
x5o6 have been described by the Legislative Reference Service as follows:
judicial Reform Act-Title I: Commission on Judicial Disabilities and Tenure-Establishes
within the judicial branch of the Government a Commission on Judicial Disabilities and Tenure
composed of five members. Requires each member be a judge of the United States who is in
regular active service. Requires the Commission, at all times, to include at least two district judges,
and two circuit judges. Provides that all members be assigned to the Commission by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court [sic]. Makes the term of the Commission four years.
Provides that the Commission shall promote the honorable and efficient administration of justice
in the courts of the United States. Permits it to act to retire or remove a judge only after an
investigation and formal hearing in accordance with the requirements of due process. Provides
that a decision to remove a judge for misconduct shall be subject to review by the Judicial Con-
ference and ultimately by the Supreme Court by certiorari. Makes such proceedings confidential.
Enables the Commission to undertake an investigation of a judge [sic] physical or mental
fitness upon a report of any person. Gives the Commission necessary powers such as the subpoena
power, depositions, etc. Authorizes the payment of fees and mileage of witnesses and provides
that U.S. marshals shall serve process and execute orders for the Commission.
See Digest of Public General Bills and Resolutions, 9ist Cong., ist Sess., LEoIs. REP. Sirv. A-9 7 (1969).
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judicial system is at such a low ebb that any misstep by an individual judge may be
attributed in the public mind to the entire federal judiciary. However, commissions
such as the one embodied in the Tydings bill will not solve these problems, for they
would be empowered to deal with the results, not the causes of our problems.0
3
Virtually all of the witnesses in the last hearings, most of whom were federal
judges, conveyed to the Subcommittee in the strongest possible terms that their legal
research and long experience convinced them that measures such as Senate Bill
15o6 are not only patently unconstitutional, but could serve as tools for disgruntled
litigants to disrupt the orderly process of the administration of justice.
Following the hearings, the Subcommittee sent a letter to every federal district
judge in the United States soliciting his views on the Tydings bill. We felt
this information would be particularly telling since the district judges would be
most involved with and affected by the measure. Of more than a hundred responses
received to date, only one indicated support for this bill.64 Most of the judges
responding were very specific in their objections, emphasizing the questionable consti-
tutionality of the measure, the unreasonable burden it would place on federal judges,
and the serious, if not fatal, damage it would do to the principle of an independent
judiciary.
One judge reflected the feelings of his colleagues:
Complete independence is a basic sine qua non for effective judges. The ques-
tion of whether this independence can ever be restricted at all without doing more
harm than good becomes more difficult philosophically with more careful study
and analysis .... It seems to me that if the problem is put into proper perspective,
and the sins of the very few judges who are lazy, or who fail to recognize their
own weakness, are viewed, not in isolation, but in proportion to those judges who
do not abuse their independence, but utilize it to give the fairest and promptest
justice that they can, there appears no real reason to resort to expedients of doubtful
constitutionality, and fraught with the likelihood of being in themselves more
dangerous than the evils against which they are directed.
A second judge predicted another danger, harassment by disgruntled litigants:
The threats to judicial independence found in the provisions of the bill are real.
Congress and not other judges should determine whether or not a judge should be
removed from office. Also, the harassment that would be put into play against a
judge by disgruntled litigants would be both burdensome and insulting to such
judge. A disgruntled litigant has his right of appeal from a judgment adverse
to him, and in these days such appeal is being made more and more easy to
accomplish.
As a third judge pointed out:
"8 S. 15o6 may be considered typical of several bills directed toward the same goal; however, it has
received by far the greatest publicity and might be considered the most controversial. I would suggest
that it would be more helpful to enact measures such as S. 3936, 9st Cong., 2d Sess., a bill I introduced
on June 9, 1970, to implement the constitutional mandate for speedy trials in the federal courts.
" The full text of these letters will be reproduced when the hearings are published.
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The Founding Fathers manifestly intended to make it very difficult to remove
federal judges. This fact has been fundamental in permitting judges the inde-
pendence to accord justice without favoritism and patronism. This beneficent
aspect of the federal judiciary will be overthrown if Title I, S. 15o6 were to become
law.
While a good portion of the Subcommittee's second round of hearings was
devoted to the Judicial Conference of the United States65 and the judicial councils
of the circuits,66 the limitations of time and space preclude any detailed discussion
in this paper of the capacity of these two bodies to infringe upon independence.
Suffice it to say that my reading of the legislative history establishing the two bodies
clearly convinces me that Congress intended them merely to be housekeeping bodies
with no power whatsoever to discipline any federal judge for the omission or com-
mission of any act. The founding fathers assigned that task to Congress. Judicial in-
dependence can just as easily be eroded by powerful hierarchies within .the judiciary it-
self as by outside pressures from the legislative and executive branches of the govern-
ment. Certain activities of the councils make it clear that their powers and functions
should be more clearly defined. The issue was raised but was left unanswered in the
two cases of Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit.6 7 In the Chandler
episode, the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit decided that it would discipline
Judge Chandler by ordering him to take no action on cases pending before him, and
by refusing to assign him any other cases. Judge Chandler, believing that this was
tantamount to an unconstitutional impeachment and conviction by the Tenth Circuit,
twice sought to have the Supreme Court pass on the issue. However, the Supreme
Court in both instances refused the opportunity to establish legal precedent for the
constitutional principle that only Congress can remove a federal judge. I agree with
Mr. Justice Black, who in the first Chandler case declared:
This is clearly and simply a proceeding by circuit judges to inquire into the fitness
of a district judge to hold his office and to remove him if they so desire. I do not
believe Congress could, even if it wished, vest any such power in the circuit judges.
One of the great advances made in the structure of government by our Constitu-
tion was its provision for an independent judiciary-for judges who could do their
duty as they saw it without having to account to superior court judges or to
anyone else except the Senate sitting as a court of impeachment.68
In the second Chandler case, the Court again refused to face the issue; instead
it held that Judge Chandler had failed to make a "case for the extraordinary relief
of mandamus or prohibition."69
Mr. Justice Black in the second Chandler case aptly expressed my opinion of the
05 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1958).
o0 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1958).
07 382 U.S. 1003 (1966) and 398 U.S. 74 (197o).
08 382 U.S. at 1005-o6.
Go 398 U.S. at 89.
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constitutionality of the actions taken by the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit
when he said:
What is involved here is simply a blatant effort on the part of the Council
through concerted action to make Judge Chandler a "second-class judge," depriving
him of the full power of his office and the right to share equally with all other
federal judges in the privileges and responsibilities of the Federal judiciary. I am
unable to find in our Constitution or in any statute any authority whatever for
judges to arrogate to themselves and to exercise such powers. Judge Chandler, like
every other federal judge including the Justices of this Court, is subject to removal
from office only by the constitutionally prescribed mode of impeachment. 70
Under no circumstances would I wish to suggest that there are no abuses within
the federal judiciary, or that there is no room for improvement either in the quality
of the judges appointed to the federal bench or of the system under which they
operate. However, I do believe that such legislative proposals as that embodied in the
Tydings bill and such heavy-handed operations of the judicial hierarchy as is
reflected in the Chandler incident represent wrong approaches to problems which
may or may not exist. We all know that no perfect judicial system can be devised
by the mind of man, and it would be sheer folly to cast away the constitutional pro-
tection we now have in a vain attempt to create such a perfect system. My reading
of the Constitution and of the history surrounding its drafting convinces me that
there is not a word or clause anywhere in that great document that would give
any one of the three branches of government the power to remove federal judges
except through the admittedly cumbersome process of impeachment, and there are
ways through which the Congress could streamline that process without running
afoul of the constitutional mandate.P1
While there may be steps available to modernize and make more efficient the
impeachment process, we must heed the warning Professor Philip B. Kurland,
one of the country's noted constitutional authorities and the Chief Consultant to the
Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, who said, "it should be kept in mind that
"I1d. at 142.
"' One such method has been suggested by Professor Preble Stolz of the University of California at
Berkeley, who appeared before the Separation of Powers Subcommittee during its second series of
hearings on judicial independence. Both there and in an excellent article entitled Disciplining Federal
judges: Is Impeachment Hopeless?, 57 CALtF. L. Rav. 659 (1969), he recommended that the impeach-
ment process be modernized and streamlined so that it can work more efficiently, while eliminating
political considerations to the maximum extent possible. This could be done by the House and Senate
within the constitutional confines of impeachment. Professor Stolz suggests that the House name a
Bipartisan Committee on judicial Fitness with its own professional staff to assist it in reviewing the work
of the judiciary and investigating allegations against federal judges. The Senate would appoint masters
to conduct formal evidentiary hearings and prepare proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law
which would be the basis of argument and decision in the Senate.
Senator Robert P. Griffin of Michigan made a similar suggestion during the first series of hearings
mentioned above: "At this time, the only way to remove a Federal judge is by impeachment. It could be
made much more effective than it is. That is one point I would like to stress. If Congress were to lay
down standards and provide better machinery for determining what constitutes a 'high misdemeanor' or
'good behaviour,' impeachment could be a far more meaningful deterrent."
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tools created by the well-intentioned for beneficent uses may fall into less worthy
hands to be used for less appropriate ends."7
The founding fathers knew that the form of government they established would
not create a judiciary composed of judicial angels who could do no wrong. They
knew that the activities of a few judges might handicap the operation of the system,
but at the same time they realized that individual liberty is best protected by an
independent judiciary composed of judges who are subject to the Constitution alone.
They had learned the lesson of history, and attempted to build safeguards into our
system which would prevent its repetition. We must not reject their wisdom-and
destroy our own freedoms-by regarding the Constitution they drafted as a piece
of ancient parchment which can be folded and rearranged to suit the whims of
individual men.
" Kurland, supra note 47, at 666.
